

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.231  
9 September 1965  
ENGLISH

---

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 9 September 1965, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. L.C.N. OBI (Nigeria)

OF MICHIGAN

DEC 23 1965

DOCUMENT  
COLLECTED BY

65-23692

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO  
Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV  
Mr. Y. GOLEMANOV  
Mr. T. DAMIANOV  
Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA  
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. S.F. RAE  
Mr. J.A. BEESLEY  
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL  
Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. F. DOBIAS

Ethiopia:

Lij M. IMRU  
Mr. A. ZELLEKE  
Mr. T. BEKELE

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI  
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE  
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVELLETTI  
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI  
Mr. S. AVETTA  
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico: Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO  
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria: Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland: Mr. J. GOLDBLAT  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI  
Mr. H. PAC

Romania: Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU  
Mr. P. MATEESCU

Sweden: Mr. P. LIND  
Mr. P. HAMMERSKJOLD  
Mr. B. VEGESACK  
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. Y.M. VORONTSOV  
Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV  
Mr. G.K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic: Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. S. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom: Lord CHALFONT  
Sir Harold BEELEY  
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN  
Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

<u>United States of America:</u>	Mr. W.C. FOSTER Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE Mr. D.S. MACDONALD Mr. P.S. BRIDGES
<u>Special Representative of the Secretary-General:</u>	Mr. D. PROTITCH
<u>Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:</u>	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the two hundred and thirty-first plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): In the course of our deliberations here in Geneva it has often occurred to me that we behave in some ways not unlike the Greeks of classical mythology. Because they could not bring themselves to believe that war and pestilence and dissension on earth could possibly be their own fault, they blamed those calamities on the Furies, whose task it was to inflict the vengeance of the gods on suffering mankind. We, too, seem sometimes to have fallen into the habit of believing that the ills and dangers of the world and its wars and dissensions are never our fault, but always someone else's.

And, of course, the ancient Greeks never called the Furies by their real name. They called them instead the Eumenides -- the Kindly Ones -- hoping that this would appease their wrath and make them go away. In the same way we seem to have devised a whole new set of names for the dangers that face us. We talk of "proliferation" and "dissemination" and "access to nuclear weapons" as though in some way these euphemisms might make the dangers less real and less pressing. But of course they do not.

As we move towards the end of our present session here it might be well to ask ourselves what we have achieved, and, where we have failed, to ask ourselves why. In the two matters that we were charged by the United Nations Disarmament Commission to treat with the greatest sense of urgency we seem, for the moment, to have reached deadlock. I believe that we have failed to realize that we have been discussing here, not abstract concepts of strategy and international politics, but the issue of whether we shall survive or perish.

I suppose we must accept now that we shall not before we leave Geneva, presumably in a few days' time, achieve any real agreement in any of the matters we came here to discuss. But it might be worth our while to look at some of the reasons for our lack of progress and to see if we can find some basis for serious negotiations in the future.

Let us look first at the problem which I still believe to be the most crucial of all the issues that confront us -- the spread of nuclear weapons. Nothing that has been said inside or outside this conference room has altered my conviction that,

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

unless we can bring about an international agreement to stop and reverse the nuclear arms race, we shall face sooner or later certain disaster. Indeed the events that have taken place in the world in the past few days have strengthened my belief that if we want to do something before it is too late we had better do it soon.

I have said from time to time that I was not clear about what exactly stood in the way of an agreement. The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, had made, it seemed to me, some vague and imprecise remarks about access by West Germany to nuclear weapons, and I asked him to be more explicit. I must confess that I am no longer in any doubt. In his speech on 7 September and in the speech of the Polish representative on 2 September it became quite clear to me what stands between us and any possibility of agreement. It is, to put the matter at its very simplest, a basic difference of approach and interpretation about the nature of military alliances. Mr. Goldblat said last Thursday:

"It is no use discussing the intricacies of political, legal or strategic aspects of .... sharing nuclear weapons; for there should be no sharing."

He went on:

"It is no use pondering over where the line should be drawn ... or for that matter over how large a margin should be accorded to the West German nuclear strivings, for the ban should be ... absolute."

(ENDC/PV.229, p.7).

In his speech on 7 September Mr. Tsarapkin was equally uncompromising, saying (ENDC/PV.230, p.7) that the real danger lay in the plans of the Western Alliance and that there was no hope of arriving at an agreement on the basis of the draft tabled by the United States (ENDC/152).

So now we know exactly where we are. The objection of the Soviet Union and its allies is not, after all, to the MLF or to the ANF, or to any other specific proposal now being discussed in the Western Alliance. It is not an objection to the stationing of nuclear weapons on German territory or to physical contact between German troops and nuclear missiles. It is much more than that. What we are being told, shorn of its polemics and loaded phrases about militarism and revanchism, is that if we want an agreement to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons we must abandon any plans to alter our strategic arrangements inside the Western

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

Alliance. To meet the fears in the communist countries of German nuclear ambitions we must undertake, in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to maintain the status quo, permanently and immutably.

I realize that is is no use saying again, as I have said many times before, that this view of West Germany as a lurking menace to the security of the Soviet Union is distorted and grotesque. I could repeat once more, at great length, the firm resolve of my Government never to take part in any arrangement that would place the control of nuclear weapons in the hands of West Germany or any other non-nuclear Power; but I realize that if I did that I should be wasting your time and mine. But what I think must be said is that, if Mr. Tsarapkin really means to make total inertia in the Western Alliance a condition of a non-proliferation agreement, he must know that the condition is unacceptable. And he must know that, if he puts forward conditions that are plainly unacceptable, many of us will have second thoughts about the sincerity with which he seeks a non-proliferation agreement at all.

I have no wish to defend military alliances or to justify their existence on any moral grounds. I realize that the world that we are looking for is one in which the use of armed force, and therefore by definition the existence of military alliances, will be looked upon as a grotesque and intolerable aberration of human behaviour. But that world is not with us yet. We still live in a world of nation States, each with its own sovereign interests and each willing to regard its military power as an extension of its national policy. So, of course, we have alliances.

The two greatest and most powerful alliances in history are NATO and the Warsaw Pact. They exist, and they will continue to exist until we begin to reach some real agreement on disarmament. Their function is to ensure the collective defence and collective security of the countries belonging to them. So far as the Western alliance is concerned this implies the concept of sharing -- sharing of costs and tasks, sharing of strategic responsibility, and sharing in the direction of weapons and forces. This, to us, is the real meaning of an alliance of free peoples. Each member expects to contribute to the strength and resources of the alliance, and each is entitled to take part in the discharge of its collective responsibilities. We have no fourth-rate members, we have no inferior partners, we make no attempt to

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

impose a monolithic unity upon our alliance; our relationship is based upon Lord Acton's famous proposition, "Freedom provokes diversity; diversity preserves freedom".

Of course it is fashionable to point out that no alliance now can be a partnership of equals so long as some of its members have nuclear weapons and others have not. And that is exactly where the nucleus of the whole matter lies. If we, in the Western Alliance, expect the non-nuclear members to rely upon the collective security which the alliance provides; if, in fact, we want to give them no reason to seek the illusory security of national nuclear independence, we must ensure that they have a full voice in the policies and strategies of the alliance, a voice consistent with the dignity of free and sovereign States -- and that includes West Germany with all the other free and sovereign States.

It may be that the Warsaw Pact is a different sort of organization -- perhaps it is not an association in which responsibility is shared but one in which control is exercised on authoritarian or paternalistic rather than collective lines. If it has become more egalitarian than it once appeared to be, we have been given no evidence of this in the speeches of Mr. Tsarapkin and his colleagues of the Warsaw Pact. Indeed, the United States representative, Mr. Foster, asked a number of what I thought were interesting and significant questions in his speech on 31 August (ENDC/PV.228, p.41) about the arrangements that have been made in the Warsaw Pact for consultation, joint decisions and the supply of nuclear warheads. So far Mr. Tsarapkin has made no answer.

I know that we often tend in this Committee to answer questions only when we have asked them ourselves or when they have been addressed to someone else. Perhaps I may be allowed to continue this deplorable practice by providing at least part of the answer to the questions addressed by Mr. Foster to Mr. Tsarapkin. I shall quote, if I may, from a leading article in Pravda of 8 August. It says:

"In fulfilling its international duty the Soviet Union has taken upon itself the basic burden of expenditure on the organization of the common defence of the countries of socialism. It generously shares military experience and military technology with the fraternal countries, aids them in the preparation of officer cadres and in the perfectioning of their armed forces. The Soviet Government actively participates in the

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

activity of the Warsaw Treaty Organization set up in connexion with the need for closer co-ordination of defence efforts of the countries of socialism in the face of the danger which is created by the activity of the aggressive military bloc of imperialists -- NATO."

Now I think I am as well qualified as anyone else here to warn my colleagues not to believe everything they read in the newspapers. But we have, after all, grown accustomed to regard leading articles in Pravda as having some relevance to official policy in the Soviet Union. Indeed, this article was entitled "The Noble Aims of Soviet Foreign Policy". It did not, I have to admit, explain exactly what it meant by "generously shares military experience and military technology", but it did use the phrase, and I suspect that it will tax even Mr. Tsarapkin's celebrated mental agility to explain the strange alchemy that makes sharing noble on the Bug and the Oder-Neisse, but ignoble and provocative on the Rhine. I can only repeat, for the benefit of all my colleagues here, that our plans for sharing in the Western Alliance present no more danger to the Warsaw Pact than the "noble" arrangements referred to by Pravda present to us in the West.

In this context I should like to refer to the great play made by the Polish representative, Mr. Goldblat, with my reference to having fingers on the safety catch rather than on the trigger. His suggestion that the United Kingdom might be, as he called it, trigger-happy (ENDC/PV.229, p.8) hardly deserves serious comment. The history of the past twenty-five years suggests that what "trigger-happiness" there has been in the world has generally speaking been elsewhere. No; my reason for using the analogy of the safety catch was that I hoped -- obviously, optimistically -- that it would reassure Mr. Goldblat and his colleagues about our intentions. A safety catch on a loaded weapon is designed to ensure that it is difficult to fire by accident or by miscalculation; and I hope, most devoutly, that the nuclear weapons deployed in the territories of East-European countries have safety catches; and I hope there are fingers on them too, -- the more the better.

I confess that I cannot follow the subtle reasoning which turns a state of affairs like that into something sinister and menacing. In the minds of most reasonable men the danger of nuclear spread lies not in where nuclear weapons are

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

physically placed, or in whose soldiers look after them; it lies in who has the power to use them. I do not pretend to know exactly what shape our arrangements in NATO will finally take, but whatever the final arrangements -- I say this again --, my Government is determined that they shall not involve any element of transfer of nuclear control. We want, sincerely and deeply, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons not only in Europe but anywhere in the world; and we are prepared to discuss the form and content of an agreement to this end and to try to reach a formula that will satisfy the Soviet Union of our good faith.

But I should be failing in my duty to this Conference if I did not make it clear that, so far as my Government is concerned, the security of NATO and its members is not up for bargaining, here or anywhere else. My friend and colleague in the United Nations, Lord Caradon, is fond of quoting Abraham Lincoln's words:

"At all events, I must have some consciousness of being somewhere near right; I must have some standard of principle fixed within myself".

However desperately we in the West may want and work for disarmament agreements, there are certain principles we will not compromise.

I should like now to turn for a few minutes to the other matter to which we were directed to attach great urgency in this Committee -- the extension of the test-ban Treaty to cover underground tests. Here again there seems to be for the moment deadlock. The Soviet Union, as Mr. Tsarapkin again made clear on 7 September (ENDC/PV.230, p.8), regards as quite unacceptable the international inspection arrangement regarded by the West as essential to an effective agreement on underground testing. Here again it is clearly a waste of time to rehearse at length the technical arguments which lead the West to its conclusion that some small measure of inspection is, in the present state of scientific detection techniques, still necessary. Yet I must say that I found it very far from a waste of time listening to my colleague, Mr. Foster, as he presented the other day his extremely valuable paper on this subject (ENDC/PV.229, pp. 18 et seq.). I feel bound to say that if the Soviet Union would produce a technical analysis of detection problems half as thorough and informative as that provided by the United States, many of our troubles might be overcome.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

So far as the position of my own Government is concerned, British scientists have been engaged for some time on a seismic research programme to examine the possibilities of a new detection system. Using electronic data processing and a new system of beam-forming arrays, we set up experimental establishments in the United Kingdom and in collaboration with American scientists in the United States. It soon became apparent that a completely new concept could be applied to detecting and identifying earthquakes and that an underground test ban might be monitored with a relatively small number of array stations.

The next stage in the research was to study specific explosions and earthquakes, using the large arrays, and that phase is still continuing. But in spite of all the technical advances that have been made -- and they have been considerable -- British scientists, like their American colleagues, report that there still remains a residual number of seismic events at or above a seismic magnitude of 4 that could not be identified by remote seismological observations alone. This is the problem that still confronts us. It remains to be seen whether further research will significantly reduce the number of unidentifiable events; and British scientists are willing to share their knowledge with this in mind. Indeed, some of their work has already been published, and all -- I repeat, all -- their findings are now being prepared for publication. I am arranging to circulate to my colleagues on the Committee a brief account of this.<sup>1/</sup>

Although, as Mr. Foster pointed out in his statement of 2 September (ENDC/PV.229, p. 21) and as I have myself just suggested, improved analysis of seismic records offers the hope of a useful increase in our capacity to identify underground events, we can hope for an even greater improvement if the analysis is based on recordings obtained not by just one country but by a global network of seismic stations.

---

1/ Circulated as document ENDC/155

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

It is in this context that I should like to welcome the Swedish initiative taken at our meeting of 10 August in calling for examination of the ways and means by which international co-operation might be improved. I hope that other countries will show similar readiness to consider the establishment of advanced seismic stations on their soil. I should like also to commend to the Soviet Union Mrs. Myrdal's proposals for technical talks, even if, as she suggested, they can deal only with "one or two items, narrowly circumscribed" (ENDC/PV.222, p.21). We are of course becoming accustomed to the blank Soviet refusal to hold technical talks on the problems of verification. However, I would find it hard to understand how the Soviet Union could justify rejecting this much more modest Swedish proposal.

In his references to a ban on underground tests Mr. Tsarapkin was quite positive on one matter at least -- his reaction to the proposal put forward by the representative of the United Arab Republic on 17 August for what might be called a partial underground test ban (ENDC/PV.224, pp. 9, 10). This would involve the extension of the Moscow Treaty to cover underground testing beyond the threshold represented by a magnitude of 4.75, together with an uninspected moratorium on all other underground tests. Mr. Tsarapkin, on behalf of the Soviet Union, unequivocally supported that proposal and called upon all Powers to do the same (ENDC/PV.230, p. 9). Now I must admit that the proposal has some obvious attractions; and I can assure the Committee that my Government will give it full and detailed consideration. I must say, however, that it seems to me at first sight to present some difficulties. In the first place, we have learnt to be very wary of these partial measures as a substitute for more comprehensive agreements; and particularly of the moratorium as a substitute for a formal treaty.

An agreement of that sort would, to put the matter crudely, still leave room for cheating. I am not suggesting that anyone would cheat or that they would gain any great advantage from doing so. But it does seem to me that any international agreement on arms control and disarmament that cannot be verified by national or international means contains within it dangerous seeds of suspicion and instability. It might be asked, therefore, why not just extend the Moscow Treaty to cover tests above a certain magnitude and leave all other tests out of the reckoning? Well, that might be even more attractive, and provided that it could be translated into effective treaty terms there would seem to be no real argument against it.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

But are we sure that we know exactly what this threshold concept involves? The seismic magnitude of an underground event, especially if it is one caused by an explosion, is a resolution of many factors: for example, the geological structure of the site of the explosion and the technical means used to reduce the shock waves, such as decoupling -- that is, detonating the explosion in a large cavity. So the threshold is not a matter of such scientific exactitude as the reassuring figure of 4.75 seems to suggest.

Here, as in other matters of scientific detection, there is room for more and closer examination. And I should like to ask Mr. Tsarapkin whether the Soviet Union would be prepared to allow its scientists to take part with Western scientists in technical discussions designed to resolve this particular problem. If so, perhaps we might yet find some common ground in the very valuable and constructive proposals put forward by the United Arab Republic.

So much for the non-dissemination treaty and the agreement to ban underground tests. Some people might say that we have not got very far this summer in Geneva; but I believe that we may have laid a foundation for some fruitful discussions when we come back here from New York.

When I was talking of the non-dissemination treaty a moment ago I dealt mainly with the need to arrive at some common ground between the Warsaw Pact countries and the West. There is of course another aspect of the problem that is just as important and may in the end be just as difficult to resolve. It is the need to reassure the non-nuclear Powers that their security will not be put permanently at risk if they undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. This has been a feature of many of the speeches by the representatives of non-aligned countries, and the **representative of Nigeria, Mr. Obi**, in his very perceptive speech of 31 August, put the matter most concisely when he said that it was not status-seeking that would drive non-nuclear Powers to acquire nuclear weapons -- it "would be a search for the maximum possible security" (ENDC/PV.228, p. 14).

It has been suggested that one of the ways of providing this maximum security without the spread of nuclear weapons is the provision of some sort of guarantee extended to non-nuclear Powers which elect to remain so. Mr. Goldblat raised a significant but rather confusing point in this connexion when he compared the positions of non-nuclear States inside nuclear-armed alliances and non-nuclear States that are non-aligned, suggesting that under a treaty of the sort tabled by the United States (ENDC/152) the non-aligned non-nuclear Powers would be the victims of some sort of

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

We too had considered that problem, and our tentative conclusions had been, not that non-nuclear States should be deprived of any form of nuclear protection and left to fare as best they could, but that a separate and concurrent effort should be made to see what assurances could be devised and, more important, what demand there was for them. As my Prime Minister said in the House of Commons on 16 December last year:

"We have in addition to deal swiftly and effectively with the problem of providing some international safeguards to non-nuclear Powers against the danger which results from new nations developing nuclear power"..... "This is why I stress at the outset the urgency of providing international safeguards to non-nuclear Powers against nuclear threats and nuclear blackmail, and to do it collectively. This is one of the most important initiatives that we must now take." (Official Report, Vol. 704, cols. 419, 439)

It will be obvious to everyone here -- including, I am sure, Mr. Goldblat -- that in a divided world this question of providing international assurances to non-nuclear Powers is one of the utmost complexity. For one thing, there is the question of how far effective safeguards are possible, how far they are acceptable, and how far they are reconcilable with non-alignment. Some countries are in a more exposed, some in a less exposed position; some want assurances, others evidently do not. There are in addition all the contingent problems that would arise in equating the degree of force to be used with the type of armed aggression that might be foreseen. As I have said before, this is an important problem and one related very closely to non-dissemination. It calls for the most careful examination on the part of both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers.

But what has impressed me with even greater force in the debate that has gone on since the question of non-proliferation crystallized so obviously in New York earlier this year has been the growing conviction among non-nuclear Powers that their real security lies not so much in guarantees as in disarmament. Again and again it has been made clear that they are looking for signs of a sincere attempt among the nuclear Powers to reduce their nuclear armouries; and, as I said at an earlier meeting of this Committee (ENDC/PV.219, pp. 7, 8) I believe this to be a justifiable attitude. I am convinced that the stability and security of the world can be assured with something much smaller than the enormous array of nuclear weapons now deployed on both sides. It is time we moved forward to some concrete proposals

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

for the destruction of existing nuclear weapons -- possibly linked with President Johnson's imaginative proposals (ENDC/120) for a freeze on the production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

This may require some deep rethinking of strategic doctrine on all sides, and it may require the courage to take what might seem to be military risks in the early stages of such a step towards disarmament. But the urgency of this as a disarmament measure in its own right is now enormously increased, to my mind, by the need to demonstrate that a non-proliferation agreement is not simply a measure designed to preserve the sanctity and pre-eminence of the nuclear club. I agree with my colleague Mr. Foster (ENDC/PV.230, p. 21) that this should not be a matter of preconditions. If the non-nuclear Powers demand nuclear disarmament before a non-proliferation agreement, and if the nuclear Powers insist on non-proliferation before nuclear disarmament, then we shall get nowhere.

We must attack these problems simultaneously and on a broad front. That is why I hope that before too long we shall have, side by side with the Western proposals for non-dissemination, some real proposals for substantial reductions in existing nuclear weapon systems. As the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, recalled on 24 August (ENDC/PV.226, p. 9), the Soviet Union, like the United States, has already outlined proposals in the field -- notably in what is called the Gromyko memorandum (A/5827 and Corr.1) of December 1964; but unfortunately the Soviet representative has said no more about this point nor put forward, so far, any fresh proposals.

Finally, as this will probably be my last chance to address the Committee before we adjourn for the General Assembly of the United Nations, may I outline very briefly once more the main principles of my Government's policy towards disarmament? First and foremost we seek an agreement on general and complete disarmament. If Mr. Tsarapkin believes -- and he seems to -- that I have offered what he has called "vague hints" (ENDC/PV.228, p. 24) about changes in the position of the United Kingdom on general and complete disarmament, I can reassure him that there has been no change; we have always stood for general and complete disarmament; we still stand for it; and we are ready to examine any proposals from any quarter to bring it about.

But we are realistic enough to realize that general and complete disarmament, however much we may want it and however hard we may work for it, will not happen overnight. And until we live in a disarmed world we have the urgent and immediate task of making the real world less precarious and dangerous a place to live in.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

For this reason, as I have said, we regard an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as of the highest importance. Other measures that are related to such an agreement -- such as a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing in all environments, a freeze on the production of nuclear delivery vehicles, and an agreed reduction in those that now exist -- all these measures we regard as equally urgent and important, not only in their own right as means of controlling the use of armed force in international affairs, but as the first small but vital steps towards disarmament.

I hope, with the greatest respect to the distinguished co-Chairmen of our Committee, that the interruption in our deliberations here will be short. The debate in New York will be an important one, but I believe there is a widespread feeling that we ought to meet again soon. Time is not on our side. There are pressures and influences and movements growing up in the world that make it vital that we should overcome the real and imagined ideological differences that keep us from agreement. The patterns of power and conflict in the world are changing and we must be prepared to re-examine the assumptions upon which we base our policies and our arguments. In the days of czarist Russia, it is said, there was an empress who planted a rose bush in her garden, and to protect the flowers she had a sentry of the Imperial Guard posted before the bush. Many years later, when the empress was dead and the garden deserted and overgrown with weeds, the sentry was still posted every day, but no one could remember what he was supposed to be guarding.

I believe that if we look hard at some of our fears, we may find that they are no longer justified; if we re-examine what we think to be the threats to our security, we may find that some of them no longer exist; if we consider carefully where our real interests lie, we may find more common ground than conflict. I know that for the moment there are reasons outside this conference hall why our dialogue cannot be an entirely fruitful one; but it may be that when we next come back to Geneva some of those reasons will have disappeared. Perhaps we shall then have the courage to take the sentry away from the empty garden and put him to some more useful task.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): Before dealing with the main subject of my statement today, I wish to say that the Bulgarian delegation must once again protest against the tendency to restrict the range of the questions that are being considered by the Eighteen-Nation Committee at the present session. Neither lack of time nor resolution DC/225 (ENDC/149) provides any justification for leaving aside the main task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, namely the preparation of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. The development of international relations reminds us more forcibly every day that the fulfilment of this task is of decisive importance for the fate of the world. The representative of Burma was fully justified in reminding us that -

"... it is necessary for us to make every effort to work towards the goal of general and complete disarmament, which is the main task entrusted to us."  
(ENDC/PV.227, p.5)

It is to be hoped that we shall return to this question as soon as possible and give it the attention which it deserves.

During the present session, as in the past, we do not of course under-estimate the so-called "collateral measures". Any success in the work of the Committee will certainly be welcomed with satisfaction by world public opinion. Thus we have all the more right to express regret at the unjustified obstacles created by the delegation of the United States in the way of an agreement so long overdue as that on the cessation of underground nuclear tests. Evidently the programme of such tests scheduled by the United States military command has not been finished, and there is no desire in the United States to leave it unfinished, if we are to judge from press reports that one of a regular series of underground nuclear explosions was carried out in the State of Nevada on the first of this month.

We do not consider it necessary to repeat the abundant evidence placed before the Committee in 1963 proving that even then the United States of America was able to detect and identify underground nuclear tests by its own national means. We shall merely recall what Mr. Rusk said before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on 11 March 1963:

(Mr. Lukyanov, Bulgaria)

"The increase in our" --- that is, the United States -- "technical ability to detect seismic events at long distances permits us to rely upon seismic stations outside the Soviet Union to detect underground nuclear explosions inside the Soviet Union." (ENDC/PV.123, p.25)

That was said in 1963. Since then, as Mr. Foster himself has assured us (ENDC/PV.229, p.19), the United States of America has made great progress in improving seismic technology. Thus the demand for on-site inspection is dictated not by technical but by altogether different considerations. It is unjustified.

We cannot find any justification for the hasty rejection by the delegation of the United States -- as well as by the delegation of the United Kingdom, as is evident from the statement made today by Lord Chalfont -- of the compromise solution of the question put forward by the delegation of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.224, pp. 9,10), which consists in the banning of underground nuclear tests above a certain magnitude and the cessation of all other underground nuclear tests until such time as final agreement is reached. The proposal of the delegation of the United Arab Republic -- a proposal with which the Bulgarian delegation agreed and which has already been supported by the delegations of Ethiopia (ENDC/PV.229, p.16) the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.230, p.9) and Czechoslovakia (ibid., p.17) -- has provided the Committee with an opportunity to end its session with a concrete and positive result in respect of this item of its agenda. Therefore there will be no need to point out who is guilty if, once again, we have no success in our work.

On the agenda of the Committee there are other proposals the solution of which is urgently called for by the actual international situation, although the differences of views on some of them are still very great. On 31 August this year, when dwelling on the proposal for the withdrawal of troops and the liquidation of military bases on the territories of other countries, the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, stated the following:

"The Soviet delegation, guided by the interests of safeguarding peace, once again urges the Eighteen-Nation Committee to discuss this question and to take measures for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from South Vietnam, Taiwan, the Congo, South Korea and Malaysia, and also, of course, from the territories of European States and other parts of the world. We suggest bringing about the liquidation of all military bases on foreign territories, and in particular, the United States

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

base at Guantanamo in Cuba and its bases in other parts of the world. Such decisions could really put a stop to the dangerous development of events in the world and would have a most favourable impact on the overall world situation and on the solution of all other problems." (ENDC/PV.228, p.28)

The Bulgarian delegation considers that in the present situation no one can or has the right to disregard such an appeal. Even the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States were unable to ignore this appeal. But what did we hear from them? Were any arguments adduced to convince us, for instance, that the Japanese people are pleased with the conversion of the island of Okinawa into an American military base, or that the people of Cuba are delighted with the presence of a United States military base at Guantanamo in their island? Were any facts adduced that showed, say, a deterioration of the situation in a number of Arab countries after the liquidation of foreign military bases on their territories? Has even a single case been cited where a military base of the Western Powers has played a positive role in the maintenance of peace anywhere in the world? We have heard nothing of the sort in the speeches of the representatives of the West.

Instead of arguments in favour of military bases on foreign territories and on account of the lack of such arguments, the representative of the United Kingdom cited cases where certain representatives of recently-liberated former colonies had acquiesced in the presence of military bases on their territories.

In Mr. Foster's arguments, however, there are propositions which make the need for the liquidation of foreign military bases even more urgent. Mr. Foster said:

"... by forbidding smaller or weaker countries to protect themselves through arrangements with other nations, the Soviet proposal would leave them vulnerable to the form of aggression which communists now call 'wars of national liberation'".  
(ENDC/PV.222, p.47)

Then Mr. Foster went on to quote a passage from the statement made by the Secretary of State of the United States on 23 April of this year, in which Mr. Rusk said:

"... acceptance of the doctrine of 'wars of national liberation' would amount to scuttling the modern international law of peace...". (ibid., p.48)

(Mr. Lukyanov, Bulgaria)

Thus it is considered in Washington that the days of national liberation movements and the struggle of peoples for freedom and independence have come to an end. And if the process of history refuses to stop, then American military bases will spring up in its path in order to stop it by force of arms. Let us leave aside the fact that such a "doctrine" fails to take into account the truth expressed by Napoleon Buonaparte when he said that one can do everything with bayonets except sit on them. Let us also leave aside for the time being the fact that, by proclaiming such a "doctrine", American statesmen acknowledge the policing role which they arrogate to themselves on a world scale. In this case what concerns us as representatives in the Eighteen-Nation Committee is the fact that the American "doctrine" concerning bases and troops on foreign territories is dangerous to the cause of peace. There is no such thing as "invisible" aggression. The struggle of the United States against such "aggression" is nothing but a flagrant intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. Hence the tension, the increase in tension, the conflicts and the open warfare, as the example of Vietnam shows.

During the war against the Fascist-Hitler coalition the establishment of military bases in various parts of the world could be justified by military necessity, although even then there was no need for the long-drawn-out period which has become the legal basis of the post-war "base strategy" of the United States of America. Since the defeat of German Fascism more than 20 years have elapsed. But the bases have not been liquidated -- on the contrary, the network of United States military bases and those of its allies has been expanded, the armaments accumulated in them have been modernized and increased, and in a number of cases they are being used for carrying out military operations.

One has only to take a look at the map of the world to see to what extent it is studded with hotbeds of military provocation and armed aggression against peaceloving countries. A few years ago, on 9 July 1962, the New York Times reported -- although the figures it quoted were far from complete -- that in Europe there were 65 major American military bases, in the Far East and the Pacific area 45, in the Caribbean 9, and so on. The number of these bases has not decreased since that time, but is increasing every day.

(Mr. Lukyanov, Bulgaria)

We will recall once again the role of military bases as springboards of neo-colonialism in its struggle to maintain the colonial system. There was the armed intervention against Egypt in 1956, and the incursions of British and United States troops respectively into Jordan and Lebanon in 1958 relied on military bases in Cyprus and others parts of the Mediterranean; in 1961 a significant role was assigned to the United States base at Guantanamo by the Cuban counter-revolutionaries and their sponsors when they undertook to invade Cuba; in 1964 the world witnessed a treacherous act of aggression when Belgian paratroops on board American aircraft took off from the British base on Ascension Island to attack the people of the Congo.

And what about the example of Vietnam? Eleven years ago that country was to have been freed from foreign troops, and north of the seventeenth parallel it has indeed been freed. As for the south, an escalation has taken place, which actually started with the sending of American military equipment, the arrival of "advisers", the support of rulers hostile to the people, including those who were unscrupulous not only politically, and has ended with a gradual involvement in military operations, the expansion of military bases along the sea coast, an increase in the strength of the American troops, and now the establishment of bases in the internal areas of the country — that is the occupation of the whole of South Vietnam and the transformation of the war being waged there into a purely American war against the whole Vietnamese people.

As a result there is not only an extraordinary tension in the whole international situation but also a threat to peace throughout the world. And among the main reasons for this situation is the presence of the military bases and foreign troops of the imperialists on the territories of other countries as supports for the policy of intervention in the affairs of other countries, as supports for the policy of arbiters of the destiny of others. When the peoples are not in agreement with this, when they wish to decide their own destiny for themselves, conflicts occur which lead up to military operations.

We are striving to find a way to such measures as would make it possible even before general and complete disarmament to reduce international tension and avoid conflicts. In these conditions such a measure, and moreover an extremely effective one, would be a decision to liquidate military bases and to withdraw foreign troops from the territories of other countries.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

The question whether the liquidation of military bases would upset the "balance" -- a question which is being raised also at the present time by the West -- has been discussed many times. The delegations of the socialist countries have shown, as the Czechoslovak delegation did once again very cogently at our meeting on 7 September, (ENDC/PV.230, p.12) the complete invalidity of the "argument" of the West that the liquidation of bases would upset the military balance.

In objecting to the proposal for the liquidation of military bases on foreign territories, the Western delegations called it "propaganda". Of course they have not supported this objection of theirs with even the flimsiest of arguments. We are loth to admit the thought that the Western Delegations are adopting an offhand attitude towards so serious a matter. It is well known that some delegations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee measure the value of any particular proposal with their criterion of so-called realism -- that is, whether it is feasible in practice and acceptable to all. Is the proposal for the liquidation of military bases on the territories of other countries realistic? A plain answer to this question comes from the fact that what has been created by man can be destroyed by man, and moreover very easily. It all depends on good will and the desire.

If unrealistic means the lack of desire to come to an agreement, the question should be settled on the basis of whether a positive solution to the problem would be useful for the cause of peace or not. Well, then, would the liquidation of military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries be useful for peace on earth? It would, and the sooner the better! It is necessary to insist on this. It is necessary to convince through united efforts, with all the weight of world public opinion, those who are still not convinced of the harm done to the cause of peace by the maintenance of military bases on foreign territories, that the question of the liquidation of these must be settled.

The Bulgarian Government has already stated its negative attitude towards the establishment of military bases outside the confines of national boundaries, when dealing with the question of NATO military bases in the Balkans and the presence of the United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The position of the Bulgarian Government remains unchanged. The events of the last few years throughout the world confirm the rightness of this position. We are in favour of the liquidation of military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops, wherever they may be found.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Among the most urgent problems of today is the growing danger of an outbreak of nuclear war. Let Mr. Foster allow us to disagree with him when he states that the Charter of the United Nations makes no distinction between types of weapons but rather between the purposes they are intended for (ENDC/PV.222, p.49). The Machiavellian maxim "The end justifies the means" is no longer considered the best norm in international relations. Still less can one agree with it when dealing with such means of warfare as nuclear weapons. Mr. Foster himself and many other United States leaders have given full and eloquent descriptions of the sufferings which the use of nuclear weapons would cause mankind in comparison with any other weapons. It appears that even in the United States nuclear weapons are regarded as something special. Therefore the representatives of the United States should also agree that a special attitude towards nuclear weapons is required.

World public opinion has already declared its negative attitude towards these weapons. They have been condemned by the popular masses, scientists and other representatives of the intellectual classes, public organizations of every tendency, many States and whole continents. Nuclear weapons have been condemned by the United Nations, which has declared their use contrary to its Charter (A/RES/1653(XVI)). In short, nuclear weapons have been declared to be morally outside the law, inhuman and a menace to the whole of human civilization and not only to the generations against which they might be used but to future generations as well.

Are there any cases in history where the use of a weapon has been banned? Yes, there are such cases. But is it possible to compare, for instance, chemical and bacteriological weapons, which were banned by international agreement many years ago, with nuclear weapons from the point of view of their inhumanity? Of course not -- nuclear weapons are ever so much worse! Then what is to be done? The best solution would be to put a stop to the production of nuclear weapons and to liquidate all the stockpiles of such weapons. But until that is achieved, one can and should examine and adopt proposals aimed at averting a nuclear war.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Obviously, since nuclear weapons have been morally condemned, it is essential to take the next step: namely, to give binding legal force to the resolution of the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly and convert it into an integral part of international law. We realize that an agreement to ban the use of nuclear weapons could not in itself entirely eliminate the danger of a nuclear war, and that this can only be done, as I have already said, through the total elimination of all types of nuclear weapons. But not one of the partial measures is aimed at solving the key problem. They are aimed at creating more favourable conditions for its solution. Consequently there is no reason to expect more from an agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons than from other partial measures.

Nevertheless, the proposal to conclude such an agreement offers good prospects, if only because it would not affect either the existing balance of forces or the security of any country, nor pose any question of control. Of course, the implementation of such a proposal would be facilitated by a preliminary declaration by the nuclear Powers that they undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, as proposed by the Government of the Soviet Union (A/5827 and Corr.1). We hope for agreement on the part of the Western nuclear Powers in regard to this question.

The imperative need to avoid a nuclear conflict is reflected in a number of proposals on which I shall not dwell at present. I shall deal with only one of them, which has occupied a central place in the present negotiations: namely, the proposal on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. There is no need to prove that the smaller the number of States possessing nuclear weapons or having access to them in any way, the less is the danger of their being used. Stating that they agree with this interpretation, the Western delegations have even submitted, upon the initiative of the United States of America, a draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (ENDC/152), the defect of which has been rightly pointed out by the representatives of the socialist countries who have spoken before me and which consists in the fact that the title of the treaty does not correspond with its content: namely that, while proclaiming one right purpose, the draft treaty pursues a purpose that is quite the opposite and wrong. To give access to nuclear weapons on a legal basis to the West German Bundeswehr, which is in the hands of hereditary militarists, to the only revanchists in Europe, to the only people who lay claim to other people's lands - that is the purpose of the proposed draft treaty. Does it correspond with its title?

(Mr. Lukyanov, Bulgaria)

It is useless for the representatives of the West to try to deny the true purpose of their draft, or to make out that it is innocuous and would not alter anything in the present international situation, or to picture their Bonn allies as veritable angels of peace. But while we are being assured here that the Bonn leaders would merely like to complement their State sovereignty with an "equal voice" in NATO military affairs (that demand alone is enough to put on their guard all those who do not want a repetition of the lamentable history that preceded the Second World War) - while we are being assured here that the West German leaders who are not striving to obtain nuclear weapons, that they are not revanchists and that they do not want other people's lands, in Bonn they give the lie to their defenders.

It is quite evident that today we are not living in 1949, when the German imperialists were lying low and holding their breath. Today in Bonn we no longer hear statements by Mr. Strauss, who in 1949 proclaimed the spirit of peace and cursed the German hand that would again dare to take up arms. That was four years after Potsdam. Then followed the rearming of Western Germany. Then came 1957 and the demand of the former Chancellor Adenauer that the Bundeswehr should be armed with all types of modern weapons. Then followed the statements, which have been quoted here, made by the ministers Schroeder and Hassel, the new Chancellor Erhard, and a number of other responsible West German leaders, calling for atomic weapons in order that the Bundeswehr might be capable of carrying out its sole mission, described by General Ulrich de Mézile, Inspector of Land Forces, as being "to become the detonator of a large explosion", to quote the Frankfurter Allgemeine of 24 October 1964.

As we see, the Western Powers are no longer able to prevent the Bonn militarists from openly proclaiming their aggressive military aims. From this fact alone should not the right conclusion be drawn that all who do not want a second Munich and who are anxious to consolidate peace in Europe must unite and ensure by their joint efforts the fulfilment of the terms of the Potsdam Agreement in order to prevent the German jingoists from plunging the world again into the catastrophe of war?

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Instead of doing this, the Western Powers are of the same mind as Bonn in defending the "right" of the Federal Republic of Germany to participate in a NATO multilateral nuclear force. In the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament they justify that "right" by saying that the Federal Republic of Germany has to fear "twenty Soviet divisions". At the same time it is being said in Bonn that the Federal Republic of Germany has to fear "seven hundred Soviet missiles". Can we really believe that the Western representatives and the world at large have forgotton the proposals made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries for disarming the two Germanys, for the withdrawal of foreign troops from their territories, for their renunciation of nuclear weapons, for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in central Europe, for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, and for many other measures that would guarantee the peaceful co-existence of the Federal Republic of Germany with its neighbours? I ask, which of those proposals has been accepted by the Federal Republic of Germany? Not a single one. And today the world is expected to believe that it is the existence of the army divisions of the socialist countries that constitutes a danger to the West German State, and that it is not a Bundeswehr with access to nuclear weapons that would constitute a danger to peace in Europe and throughout the world.

What a difference there is between the behaviour of the Bonn authorities and that of the Government of the German Democratic Republic in regard to nuclear armament! We may differ in our attitudes to the German socialist State, but one cannot - and this is regrettable indeed - reject, as the Western delegations have done, the constructive proposals contained in the statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic of 10 August 1965 (ENDC/151). The Bulgarian delegation supports that statement, and considers that the proposals contained in it are of great interest for the present and future work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and not only for the work of this Committee. One can be quite sure that in the work of the forthcoming conference on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons the voice of the German Democratic Republic will resound loud and clear in favour of peace. The German Democratic Republic proposes:

(Mr. Lukyanov, Bulgaria)

- (a) that both German States should renounce the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons and their control in any form;
- (b) that the German States should agree to cease any further arming;
- (c) that the two Germanys should form part of the nuclear-free zone of central Europe.

As we see, the proposals of the German Democratic Republic have a direct bearing on the problems on the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. In stressing and welcoming the desire of the German Democratic Republic to contribute to the success of our work, we cannot fail to be critical of those representatives who, having nothing to say as regards the substance against the Declaration of the German Democratic Republic, repeat year in, year out, that they do not recognize the German Democratic Republic. Of course it is their right to do so; but facts are not thereby changed, and the fact remains that the representatives of that part of Germany which alone has carried out the Potsdam agreement propose measures regarding disarmament and the reduction of tension, measures which would ensure the maintenance of peace in the most sensitive nerve centre in the world - the centre of Europe.

No such proposals have come from Bonn. Is that a matter of chance? Not at all. However much one may try here to stick the wings of angels of peace on to the 1,800 former most responsible collaborators of Hitler, who today have a decisive voice in politics, in justice, in the direction of public education, in the Bundeswehr command and in all sectors of the life of West German society, it is quite clear that these heirs of Hitler are zealously striving to lay their hands as quickly as possible on atom bombs, to which they would be given access by the United States draft treaty on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. That this is so is shown best of all by the equation sign which Bonn places between national ownership of nuclear weapons and participation in a NATO multilateral nuclear force.

For the foregoing reasons the Bulgarian delegation is unable to agree with the draft treaty on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons proposed by the United States delegation (ENDC/152). Any opponents of the dissemination of nuclear weapons who put their signatures to the aforesaid draft treaty would be compelled to watch the nuclear arming of West Germany and would be unable to object or to withdraw from the agreement without running the risk of being taken for advocates of the dissemination of the very weapons they wish to restrict. We have already said and will say again: a treaty

(Mr. Lukyanov, Bulgaria)

on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons must unambiguously prohibit any access to such weapons by the West German armed forces through a NATO multilateral nuclear force. That is how the Bulgarian delegation views this question.

At the beginning of this discussion in the Eighteen-Nation Committee the delegation of the Western Powers tried very hard to convince us and all those who are keeping an eye on our work of their desire to carry out as soon as possible the recommendations of the resolution of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in regard to two problems; the cessation of all nuclear tests, and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Western representatives have now been given an opportunity to fulfil their desire very quickly by accepting -

1. the proposal of the United Arab Republic to ban large nuclear tests and to cease all underground nuclear tests until the question of a comprehensive treaty is settled (ENDC/PV.224, pp. 9, 10);
2. the idea that a treaty on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons must provide for non-dissemination and not covert dissemination, so that all would be able to sign it with a clear conscience.

At the same time we should like to hope that the Committee will be able to set about considering those particularly urgent problems the solution of which would halt the drift towards military conflicts, and also, of course, the preparation of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): Today I am going to speak about extending the Moscow Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in three environments (ENDC/100, Rev.1) to prohibit underground testing also. As we all know, the United Nations Disarmament Commission resolution DC/225 (ENDC/149) called upon us to consider this as a priority task. We should therefore all try to see whether there is any way in which we can promote some action, do something so as to be able to report to the General Assembly that we have tried to carry out the mandate of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Although I dealt at our meeting of 5 August with certain aspects of this matter, in particular the desirability of exchanging scientific and technical information (ENDC/PV.221, pp.20, 21), I should like to make a few further comments today, following what has been said by others of our colleagues.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Canadian delegation agrees with those who have stressed that it is most urgent that we should make some advance towards a comprehensive treaty, one which would prohibit all nuclear tests. The Moscow Treaty already exercises a certain braking effect on nuclear proliferation; and if it could be made comprehensive, that would produce a much more effective check. Such extension of the Moscow Treaty would also be an indication that the nuclear Powers were not intending to develop new generations of nuclear weapons. In that way it would represent a slowing-down of the arms race.

We have known for several years that the principal obstacle to extending the partial test ban to include underground tests has been the difference of opinion as to what procedures would be necessary to verify compliance with the prohibition of underground testing. Most representatives who have spoken on this subject have referred to encouraging reports of recent progress in the techniques of detecting and identifying underground tests; and finally, at our meeting of 2 September, Mr. Foster set forth for us (ENDC/PV.229, p.20) the "state of the art" -- or technique -- as it now is, developed through scientific studies and far-reaching experiments by the United States and United Kingdom authorities. We have today had a further statement on the subject by the representative of the United Kingdom.

I think I can sum up Mr. Foster's report at our 229th meeting by saying that it reveals that considerable progress has been made towards being able to detect and identify underground seismic events from great distances so as to obviate the need for on-site inspections. However, from Mr. Foster's statement I believe it is clear that we are still some distance from this objective.

It is also clear from Mr. Foster's statement that there is still much greater difficulty in identifying an underground event giving rise to seismic signals as either an earthquake or a nuclear explosion, than there is in detecting that such an event has taken place. We have had all this explained to us many times already in this Committee; but Mr. Foster's statement tells us that, in spite of improvements actually achieved and those foreseen, there still is and still will be this greater difficulty in identifying than in detecting.

There is at present, we understand, an existing ability to detect underground events of a seismic magnitude of 4, which corresponds to the signal which would be given by a nuclear explosion of less than twenty kilotons under average conditions;

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

and with the new large arrays in optimum geographical sites, signals of lower seismic magnitude, corresponding to those which would be caused by nuclear explosions equivalent to a few hundred tons of trinitrotoluene -- that is, a fraction of a kiloton -- could be detected. But now, and in the conditions foreseen if large arrays are set up, there would still, as we understand it, be 20 per cent of detected underground events which could not be identified as earthquakes and which might therefore be nuclear explosions.

We have heard proposals relating to agreements to prohibit nuclear explosions above a certain level. These proposals rest on the idea that it is possible now to identify any underground test which would give rise to a signal of some specific seismic magnitude, and that this specific seismic magnitude corresponds to the explosive effect of a nuclear device of a specific number of kilotons. But, as the Canadian delegation understood and understands the United States statements and explanations, a clear and definite relation of this kind has not been established: it is not possible to say that nuclear tests above any stated magnitude expressed in kilotons could all be identified. The character of the geological strata in which the explosion takes place is, as we have heard, one factor that causes variation in the relationship between the size of explosion and signal received; and there are others, as Lord Chalfont explained to us this morning.

The point of all this, it seems to the Canadian delegation, is that we need much more precision in scientific terms, definitions of what exactly is meant by "threshold", in our discussions and proposals here. It comes to this: that we need an exchange of scientific information, a clear and informed discussion, so that we shall all understand precisely the significance of what we are being asked to agree to if we are talking of limiting underground testing in terms of successive lowering of "thresholds".

In this connexion we have been interested in the remarks reported to have been made by our Soviet Union colleague at a recent Press conference. These were to the effect that some natural underground events cannot be distinguished from some nuclear tests, but that such nuclear tests would be so small as not to be significant from a military point of view. Is this indeed the position of the Soviet Union? If so, it is rather different from the claim that all nuclear tests can be detected by national means alone, a claim the representative of the Soviet Union,

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Mr. Tsarapkin, has made from time to time -- for example, on 20 August 1964 (ENDC/PV.200, pp. 28-29). It would imply, as I say, if this report of Mr. Tsarapkin's statement is correct, that the Soviet Union considers that there is a level of magnitude of explosion below which underground nuclear tests could not be identified. This is one of the aspects of the subject on which, it seems to the Canadian delegation, it would be useful to have an exchange of scientific information.

The general observation which I have made would seem to apply in particular to the suggestion of the representative of the United Arab Republic for banning tests of a seismic magnitude of 4.75 and above as a step on the way to a total ban on underground tests. This suggestion was supported at our last meeting by the representative of the Soviet Union, who linked it -- rather more closely than did the United Arab Republic representative, it would seem -- to an agreement on a moratorium on all other underground tests (ENDC/PV.230, p.9). This would seem to be simply another way of stating the Soviet proposal for a complete underground test ban using national means of verification alone -- a proposal which, as Mr. Tsarapkin knows very well, is not acceptable to the West.

We note also that the representative of the United Arab Republic said on 17 August:

"... we still believe as we have believed in the past that exchanging scientific and other information between the nuclear Powers, or continued improvement of detection and identification techniques, might help us to reach finally an agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty." (ENDC/PV.224, p.10)

I have mentioned reported remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union which -- if he made them -- would seem to imply that he recognizes that there is a problem of detecting small underground tests. However, we know that so far he has refused to consider an exchange of scientific and technical information either in this Committee or in any other body on the subject of the identification of underground nuclear explosions. His position -- and I think I do not misrepresent it -- is that, to have the Moscow Treaty extended to comprise underground testing, all that is necessary is a political decision to do this. He denies or ignores the fact that there is any difficulty in detecting and identifying underground nuclear tests by national means, but without giving us any scientific or technical arguments to prove that is so and to rebut the contention of the North Atlantic nations to the

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

contrary. Again, on 7 September, Mr. Tsarapkin repeated that -

"... national means of detecting nuclear explosions ... are quite adequate for monitoring such a ban." (ENDC/PV.230, p.9)

It should be noted that "adequate" does not necessarily imply that all nuclear explosions could be detected by national means. Taken together, Mr. Tsarapkin's comments seem to indicate that he is demanding an act of faith rather than a political decision; and acts of faith are insufficient to provide the basis for a durable agreement between nations in the sphere of disarmament.

We have been somewhat puzzled by the comments of the representative of Czechoslovakia at our meeting of 10 August. Mr. Cernik said, in connexion with requests for an exchange of information:

"In the conditions now prevailing in the world there are reasons why the governments of some States cannot publish certain facts." (ENDC/PV.222, p.42)

The Canadian delegation is unable to understand what disadvantage there would be to the security of any nation in divulging the scientific basis of the methods it uses for detecting and identifying underground tests. We have heard many times the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom indicate their readiness to engage in technical talks. This was repeated in Mr. Foster's statement of recent date (ENDC/PV.229, p.24) and by Lord Chalfont today. One can only hope that on reflection the Soviet Union will recognize that the value of a test ban would outweigh any possible risks which might be involved in technical talks leading to it. As the representative of India pointed out in his statement on 12 August:

"... it is desirable ... to take ... some theoretical risks in order to achieve one more significant landmark in our path of progress towards disarmament." (ENDC/PV.223, p.11)

I should now like to comment on the relationship between a comprehensive test ban and the non-dissemination problem. On 10 August Mrs. Myrdal, the

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

representative of Sweden, put these points very clearly. She said:

"As I have said already, as far as the non-nuclear Powers are concerned this would achieve the same result de facto as a non-dissemination treaty. A comprehensive test ban is a non-proliferation measure, and an effective one. This was acknowledged, by the way, by the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, when he said that the extension of the partial test-ban Treaty ... to underground tests would 'deal forcefully with the problem of nuclear proliferation'." (ENDC/PV.222, p.16)

The point is, of course, that if a country intends to produce a nuclear weapon it must carry out a test; a weapon which is untested is not one on which anyone would wish to rely.

The Canadian delegation has explained (ENDC/PV.226, pp.5 et seq.) its view that, if non-nuclear States are to be expected formally to renounce the right to acquire nuclear weapons, they can quite legitimately expect some quid pro quo in the form of progress towards halting the arms race in other sectors. In the speech from which I have already quoted Mrs. Myrdal said:

"As for the nuclear Powers, a complete test ban might only deprive them of some prospects of further perfecting their nuclear weapons -- that is, make more static a situation which is at present dangerously dynamic and which would continue to be dynamic even under a non-proliferation treaty. ... It is this dynamic aspect of the present gap that weighs heavily with the non-nuclear Powers." (ENDC/PV.222, p.17)

A comprehensive test-ban treaty would also have the advantage, in conjunction with any treaty on non-proliferation or non-dissemination, that the non-nuclear States would have a further assurance through effective verification that there was no nuclear testing, that other parties were not violating their obligations not to develop nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Canada has followed with interest the views expressed from time to time by the Swedish authorities on the possibility of forming a "detection club". We welcome the action of the representative of Sweden in placing at our 229th meeting a memorandum (ENDC/154) on what is proposed before this Committee. Of course it will be necessary for my Government to give further careful consideration to the proposals, but I believe that I may say in a preliminary way that we see great advantages in the establishment of an international network of seismological stations in various parts of the world to provide data on seismic events and on possible underground explosions. It occurs to us that there is a need for co-ordination of views on the concept of a chain of elaborate arrays of seismographs set out in Mr. Foster's statement (ENDC/PV.229, pp.20 et seq.) and the kind of organization which is suggested in the proposals tabled by Mrs. Myrdal (ENDC/154).

Canada's geographical position and the development of seismological science in our country are such that we may be able to play a useful part in the building-up of any world-wide system of reporting on seismic events and detecting underground nuclear explosions; or perhaps I should put it more hopefully, of providing a system which could detect and identify underground nuclear explosions and would therefore provide a deterrent against anyone's undertaking them. Canada has already contributed in various ways to experiments in improving detection and identification techniques which have been spoken about in this Committee. I feel I can assure the Committee that our country would be prepared to play an appropriate part in any arrangements that might be agreed for maintaining verification apparatus for a comprehensive test ban, and we should be ready to engage in any discussions on this matter that might be proposed.

In closing, the Canadian delegation hopes to hear other delegations' views on how it would be possible for us to make some progress towards a comprehensive nuclear test prohibition treaty. We should like especially to hear views on what should be the next steps to be taken and what we can report to the United Nations General Assembly as to how we have tried to fulfil the request in regard to this matter contained in United Nations Disarmament Commission resolution 225 (ENDC/149).

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): At our last meeting, held on 7 September, the Soviet delegation made a statement (ENDC/PV.230, p.9) informing the Committee of the readiness of the Soviet Government to meet the position of the United Arab Republic and some other non-aligned States and to agree to a cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests on the conditions set out by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, on 17 August of this year (ENDC/PV.224, pp.9,10). At that time the Soviet delegation called upon all other States represented in this Committee, and in particular the United States, also to support this proposal, which would make it possible to put an end immediately to any further nuclear weapon tests.

However, in his statement at our last meeting the representative of the United States, after dealing briefly with the substance of the question, saw fit to remind the Committee of the position of the United States in regard to a moratorium in general (ENDC/PV.230, p.18). What Mr Foster said on that score was assessed as indicating the obvious unwillingness of the United States to adopt the aforesaid proposal of the United Arab Republic. He said that the United States did not agree with the proposed idea of a moratorium. He made it clear that he regarded the proposal for a moratorium as a half-measure which could not create good prospects for the banning of all nuclear weapon tests.

We cannot pass over in silence this statement by Mr. Foster, because it shows that at the present time the United States simply has no intention of agreeing to any ban on underground nuclear weapon tests. The statement about the unacceptability to the United States of an "unverified moratorium", as Mr. Foster put it, should not mislead anyone. First of all it should be pointed out that the idea of a moratorium has been proposed for the very reason that it is not as yet possible to reach agreement on the nature of the control over compliance with a ban on underground tests. Therefore to speak about a moratorium with inspection would in point of fact mean solving the problem in the United States way and accepting the United States position in regard to foreign inspection... We all know that no agreement can be reached on that basis. But obviously that is precisely what the United States is striving for.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

It is common knowledge that, since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, the United States has carried out many dozens of underground nuclear explosions. During this year alone, as reported by the Press, eighteen underground nuclear tests have been announced by the United States. The total number of underground nuclear weapon tests conducted by the United States has already long been in the three-figure bracket. It is quite obvious that all these numerous tests are being carried out by the United States not at all in order to enrich seismic science, or merely to cause earth tremors. The United States--as Mr. Foster himself admitted on 2 September (ENDC/PV.229, p.19)--attaches great military importance to underground nuclear tests.

In passing, Mr. Foster tried to ascribe a similar view to the Soviet Union -- for which, however, we have given him no authority. We have a different approach to the matter. We consider that underground nuclear weapon tests should be banned immediately. But the position of the United States in this matter is altogether different. It stands for the continuation of underground nuclear weapon tests. That is the crux of the matter, and everyone in the world is fully aware of the purpose of the series of underground nuclear tests which are being carried out one after another in the United States. It is obvious to everyone that the United States is perfecting new types of nuclear weapons. Their specifications, however, were unknown.

Now we know the specifications of one type of nuclear weapon which has already been perfected in the United States in the course of these underground nuclear tests. Yesterday it became known in Washington, and it was announced in the press, that the United States army had a new nuclear weapon called "Code No. 207". This weapon is intended for use by divisions of the United States Army. Thus it has become known that the military arsenal of the United States has been supplied with a new tactical nuclear weapon "No. 207", while underground tests of nuclear weapons in the United States continue with unabated intensity.

What does this mean? It means that during the course of these continuing underground tests in the United States more and more new types of nuclear weapons are being perfected -- "208", "209", "210", and so on. That is the real reason why the

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

United States refuses to accept the extension of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, to cover underground tests as well. That is the only reason.

That explains also the objections which were so hurriedly voiced by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, to the proposal of the United Arab Republic for the halting of underground nuclear weapon tests.<sup>1</sup> The question of foreign control and the need for foreign on-site inspection are put forward by the United States merely as a technical pretext, as a technical means of disguising its real intentions and blocking any possibility of reaching agreement on this question.

The same line was taken by the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, and the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, who in their statements today obviously tried to help the United States in its attempt to avoid a political solution of this question and to drive the question of banning underground nuclear weapon tests into a quagmire of unending, fruitless technical disputes. Mr. Burns referred to a statement I made at a Press conference. I must point out that what I said was not said at an official meeting of the Committee. But the reference by Mr. Burns to the fact that every day there occur thousands of large, medium, small, and very small underground tremors shows precisely the huge possibilities there are of leading any technical discussions on this subject into an endless deadlock. Precisely this fact emphasizes the need for a political approach to the solution of this problem, not a resumption of technical disputes.

The statements made by representatives of non-aligned countries in our Committee have shown how serious is the desire of the overwhelming majority of countries to bring about the earliest possible cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests. What the majority of the members of the Committee would like is that the United States, which is crammed to the limit with nuclear weapons of various types and for various purposes, should reconsider its negative position and agree to the proposal of the United Arab Republic, and thus it would be possible to put an end to nuclear tests for ever. To solve this long-drawn-out problem at the present time, all that is needed is good will on the part of the United States and nothing more.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): The Soviet representative has again today repeated his support for an unverified moratorium on small underground tests accompanied by a treaty banning tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75. There can be no mistake about that proposal. It is an old Soviet proposal. It has been said by the Soviet representative that some of our proposals go back to 1958; I suspect that this Soviet proposal may even antedate 1958. It has a new label; Mr. Tsarapkin has again today urged adoption of a comprehensive test ban without on-site inspections just as he has since 1963 at least. His position is that there should be no inspections, that adoption of an underground ban is a purely political question, and that there must be a political decision. That is, as I say, an old position.

We have attempted to point out and to prove, as science has proved, that in a substantial number of instances it is impossible to differentiate between earthquakes and nuclear explosions. That still continues to be the situation. As long as those unidentifiable incidents remain, then, in order to have a durable agreement, it is essential, as Mr. Burns said today, that there should be a means of verifying what has actually taken place. But the USSR refuses to agree. That means that today, as before, one nation and one nation alone -- not the United States -- stands in the position of preventing the achievement of a comprehensive test ban to stop all nuclear tests, with the contribution that this would make to limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. That cannot be concealed or avoided by statements about its being only a political decision. It must be political in a sense; but a good political decision -- in order to achieve what we are all here to achieve -- must be based also on the state of scientific knowledge in the world today about how a test ban can be monitored.

As we have said so frequently, we have devoted large resources to improving detection and identification capabilities; we are continuing to devote large resources to such improvement.

The United Kingdom representative said today that through its contributions the United Kingdom has improved this capability, making it possible -- and I quote my friend from the Soviet Union -- with "goodwill" to achieve what we all know should be achieved here and now. I am sorry that I have to point to this position taken by the Soviet Union as being one that stands in the way of what we all want, but that indeed is the situation.

(Mr. Foster, United States of America)

The position of my delegation is clear: various types of arrangements for an unverified underground ban, regardless of the form which they take or the length of time to which they would apply, are unacceptable to my Government. I believe all delegations will still recall the most unfortunate experience the United States -- and, I think it can be said, the whole world -- had in the autumn of 1961 when, despite an understanding with the USSR, the greatest series of nuclear tests in history was suddenly undertaken by the Soviet Union. Since that time we have said consistently that a moratorium is not a safe and reliable means of securing a cessation of tests, and that is true today.

I shall quote something that was said in 1962:

"It is of course a sad historical fact that the Soviet Union ended the last voluntary moratorium by resuming tests a year ago. But we also know that the Government of the United States itself was not free from strong pressure to resume testing. To its great credit it then resisted the pressure."

(ENDC/PV.78, p.7)

That was a quotation from a statement made at the plenary meeting of this Conference on 3 September 1962 by the representative of Burma, who then continued his discussion of the moratorium by saying:

".... if an unconditional moratorium on underground tests were now to be declared, who could doubt that it would not be long before internal pressures built up again on both sides to a point where they would become irresistible; and, as we see today, a moratorium that fails adds greatly to the magnitude of our problem." (ibid.)

I think it is clear to all who are acquainted with United States policy over the years that a test ban cannot be concluded by my Government where there is no provision or effective arrangements to ensure the observance of agreements entered into. In the case of underground testing this still means that some on-site inspections are required.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

Since the representative of the United States has tried to assert here that the Soviet Union resumed its tests at a time when a moratorium was in existence, I think it necessary to set the record straight. Actually -- and Mr. Foster also should know this -- the then President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, stated on 31 December 1959 that the United States would not in future consider itself bound by the moratorium, and

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

therefore, legally, from 1 January 1960 there was no moratorium in effect. It is known also that the United States was already at that time carrying out intensive preparations for nuclear testing, especially underground. That was the real situation with regard to the moratorium. As you see, there was no violation of the moratorium by the Soviet Union, since the United States had denounced it. What the representative of the United States has just said shows that the United States does not wish to give up continuing its series of underground weapon tests and that it is not prepared to accept a ban on underground nuclear weapon tests. We can only express our regret.

Mr. FOSTER (United States): I hesitate to carry on this unfruitful discussion. I think it is perfectly clear that the Soviet Union also is continuing to test underground. I think it is clear also that, in recalling what was said in 1959 by our then President, one should recall also that the then Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Krushchev, said on 14 January 1960 that the Soviet Union would not be the first to resume testing. I think the facts speak for themselves.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 231st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Obi, representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Canada, Soviet Union and the United States.

"The delegation of the United Kingdom tabled a paper entitled 'Notes on United Kingdom research on techniques for distinguishing between earthquakes and underground explosions'.<sup>1/</sup>

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 14 September 1965, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.

1/ Circulated as document ENDC/155.